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SPOTIFY’S DIRECT LISTING: IS IT A
RECIPE FOR GATEKEEPER FAILURE?
Brent J. Horton*
ABSTRACT
On April 3, 2018, Spotify Technology S.A.—a music streaming com-
pany valued in excess of $20 billion—went public by direct listing on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). A direct listing is distinguishable from
the more traditional initial public offering (IPO) in a number of ways, but
the most important for purposes of this Article is that it foregoes the tradi-
tional underwriter.
First, this Article explains direct listings, why a company would choose
to go public by direct listing, and the mechanics of a direct listing. Second,
this Article explains that a direct listing—with its reliance on a financial
advisor to shepherd the transaction to completion (as opposed to the un-
derwriter-shepherded IPO)—is a danger to investors. In a traditional IPO,
underwriters are incentivized to act as gatekeepers. Underwriters allow
worthy companies to enter the public exchanges, and, conversely, exclude
unworthy companies.
Financial advisors to a direct listing do not have the same incentives to
act as gatekeepers. Financial advisors do not market or sell shares in a
direct listing, and as such, are less likely to be held reputationally responsi-
ble for a flop. Neither do financial advisors face Securities Act liability,
which would make them think twice before thrusting a troubled company
on potential investors. The fact that financial advisors are less likely to be
effective gatekeepers is an important finding. Several tech unicorns are
likely to go public soon—they will attract billions of dollars of investors’
money—and are considering doing so by direct listing (Airbnb, Pinterest,
and Uber are the prime candidates).
Finally, this Article assumes that direct listings are here to stay. As such,
this Article presents for discussion some ideas for making direct listings
safer for investors. The first, is to align the profitability of the financial
advisor with the profitability of the company that is direct listing (deferred
fees tied to long-term company performance is one possibility). Or second,
financial advisors could be required to “opt in” to liability under Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
* Associate Professor of Law & Ethics, Fordham University Gabelli School of Busi-
ness. LL.M. in Corporate Law, New York University School of Law; J.D., Syracuse Uni-
versity College of Law. Thank you to Fordham University Gabelli School of Business for
grant assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON April 3, 2018, Spotify Technology S.A.—a music streamingcompany valued in excess of $20 billion—went public by directlisting on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).1 A direct list-
ing is distinguishable from the more traditional initial public offering
(IPO) in several ways,2 but the most important for purposes of this Arti-
cle is that it does not involve an underwriter.3
Spotify’s direct listing—minus the underwriter—sent shockwaves
through Wall Street where underwriting accounts for twenty-five percent
of investment bank revenue.4 The Wall Street Journal reported that it was
“bad news”5 for underwriters, and “a blow to the already beleaguered
[underwriting] business.”6
I believe that the hand-wringing over the possible demise of the under-
writer is unwarranted. Underwriting is far from dead, or to loosely quote
Mark Twain, “rumors of its demise are greatly exaggerated.”7 That being
said, Spotify’s direct listing—especially if it is followed by other large tech
firms—may begin a trend of eliminating underwriters from a significant
number of going public transactions (or at least a significant number of
1. The story of Spotify’s direct listing is told by a series of articles in the Wall Street
Journal. See Maureen Farrell & Telis Demos, Spotify’s Debut May Not Be Music to Bank-
ers’ Ears, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2017, at A1 [hereinafter Farrell & Demos, Spotify’s Debut];
Alexander Osipovich & Maureen Farrell, NYSE Pins Hopes on ‘Spotify Rule’—To Woo
‘Unicorns,’ the Big Board Seeks Tweak Involving Direct Listings, an Alternative to IPOs,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2017, at B1 [hereinafter Osipovich & Farrell, NYSE Pins Hopes];
Maureen Farrell & Anne Steele, Spotify Registers for NYSE Listing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2018, at B3 [hereinafter Farrell & Steele, Spotify Registers]; Maureen Farrell, Spotify Chal-
lenges Bankers on IPOs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2018, at A1 [hereinafter Farrell, Spotify
Challenges]; Maureen Farrell, Spotify to Sell About a Third of Shares, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2018, at B14 [hereinafter Farrell, Spotify to Sell]; Maureen Farrell, Alexander Osipovich &
Anne Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut Pressures Banks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2018, at A1
[hereinafter Farrell, Osipovich & Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut]; Maureen Farrell & Chel-
sey Dulaney, Spotify’s Slump Raises Listing Questions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5 2018, at B1
[hereinafter Farrell & Dulaney, Spotify’s Slump].
2. For a direct listing: (1) no new capital is raised; (2) no new shares are sold; and (3)
no underwriter is used. See infra Part III. For a direct listing, already issued, but heretofore
privately traded shares, are listed. Id. Because a direct listing does not aim to raise capital,
it is distinguishable from other forms of underwriter-less offerings, such as the direct public
offerings (DPOs) and Dutch Auction IPOs. See Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 853, 855 (2007). Another source of confusion is that “direct listing”
is sometimes used to refer to cross listing of foreign stock. See Amir N. Licht, Genie in a
Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International Securities Transactions, 2000
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 58 (2000).
3. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spotify Listing: Can an “Underwriter-less” IPO Attract
Other Unicorns?, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia
.edu/2018/01/16/the-spotify-listing-can-an-underwriter-less-ipo-attract-other-unicorns/
[https://perma.cc/5HQW-CFHF].
4. Farrell, Spotify Challenges, supra note 1.
5. Farrell & Demos, Spotify’s Debut, supra note 1.
6. Farrell, Spotify Challenges, supra note 1.
7. See DEATH, http://www.twainquotes.com/Death.html [https://perma.cc/9QET-
R8QQ] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
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large going public transactions).8 This Article argues that eliminating un-
derwriters from even a portion of going public transactions is bad for
investors.9
Investment banks—as underwriters—have traditionally played a key
gatekeeping role in the going public process.10 They allowed worthy com-
panies to enter a public exchange (like the NYSE) and conversely, barred
the unworthy.11 In so doing, they protected investors from immediate
risks (i.e., protecting investors from outright frauds, which quality under-
writers will not countenance) and less immediate risks (i.e., protecting
investors from companies that are unlikely to generate long-term
profits).12
However, in a direct listing, investment banks are relegated to the role
of financial advisor.13 An investment bank acting as a financial advisor is
less motivated to be an effective gatekeeper.14 It has less reputational
capital at stake.15 It is less financially tied to the success of the direct
listing.16 It is less likely to face liability under the Securities Act.17
My argument is organized as follows: Part II and Part III compare and
contrast the traditional IPO and a direct listing, pointing out when a di-
rect listing can be used (i.e., by unicorn tech firms18), as well as possible
advantages to a direct listing; Part IV uses the Spotify direct listing as a
case study, to see if it actually worked as intended; Part V discusses the
gatekeeping role that investment banks play in going public transactions,
and how that role is compromised when the investment bank’s role
changes from underwriter (in an IPO) to financial advisor (in a direct
listing); and finally, Part VI concludes and makes some recommendations
for moving forward.
8. Legislative Proposals to Help Fuel Capital and Growth on Main Street or The Irre-
pressible Myth that SEC Overregulation Has Chilled IPOs: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Mkts., Sec., and Inv. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs. of the U.S. H.R., 115th Cong.
2–3, 17 (2018) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Colum-
bia Univ. Law Sch.), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-115-ba16-
wstate-jcoffee-20180523.pdf (“To be sure, high-tech ‘unicorns’ do go public [via IPO] (as
Dropbox exemplified this year), but . . . [o]ther private companies may follow Spotify and
do a ‘direct listing’.”).
9. It is true the vast majority of companies still go public by IPO, with the accompa-
nying underwriter to perform the gatekeeping role. However, it is also true that several
tech unicorns are likely to go public soon—they will attract billions of dollars of investors’
money—and are considering doing so by direct listing. These include Airbnb, Pinterest and
Uber. See Andrew Osterland, The IPO Bypass, GLOBAL FIN., Mar. 2018, at 16.
10. See infra Section V.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See infra Section III.C.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Section V.B.
16. See infra Section V.C.
17. See infra Section V.D.
18. A unicorn is a private company with a valuation greater than $1 billion privately.
They are called “unicorns” in recognition of their relative rarity. See Jennifer S. Fan, Regu-
lating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 584 (2016)
(defining unicorn).
2019] Spotify’s Direct Listing 181
This Article concludes that investment banks acting as financial advi-
sors—due to the limitations on their role—are less effective gatekeepers
than investment banks acting as underwriters.19 That means that inves-
tors in a direct listing are less protected.20 This Article focuses on explain-
ing direct listings, and explaining why foregoing the traditional reliance
on underwriters—and the gatekeeping role they play—is bad for inves-
tors. Nonetheless, this Article presents some possibilities for making di-
rect listings safer for investors (the intent here is to begin the scholarly
debate). One possibility is to tie the fees of the financial advisor to the
success of the directly listed company (i.e., deferred fees tied to long-term
company performance).21 Alternatively, financial advisors could be re-
quired to “opt in” to liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933.22
This is (to my knowledge) the first journal article to explain direct list-
ings, and the possible harm to investors. However, the topic has recently
garnered significant attention on various well-respected legal blogs, in-
cluding the CLS Blue Sky Blog,23 the Business Law Prof Blog,24 and the
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation.25
II. GOING PUBLIC BY TRADITIONAL IPO
The best way to understand direct listings is to compare them to tradi-
tional IPOs, in terms of: (1) purpose, (2) required SEC filings, (3) restric-
19. See infra Parts V, VI.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part VI.
22. See infra Section V.D and Part VI.
23. Coffee, supra note 3; Dan W. French, Andrew E. Kern, Thibaut G. Morillon &
Adam S. Yore, How Exchange Listing Affects Corporate Governance, THE CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (June 25, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/06/25/how-exchange-listing-
affects-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/HAL5-VKVW]; Ambrus Kecske´s, Spo-
tify’s Direct Listing in the U.S. and Lessons from the UK, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar.
1, 2018) http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/03/01/spotifys-direct-listing-in-the-u-s-
and-lessons-from-the-uk/ [https://perma.cc/T9W8-MGPK].
24. Jeremy R. McClane, Spotify IPO This Week May Upend How Startups Raise Capi-
tal: Guest Post, BUSINESS LAW PROF. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad
.com/business_law/2018/04/spotify-ipo-this-week-may-upend-how-startups-raise-capital-
guest-post.html [https://perma.cc/82EK-R5B9].
25. Nicolas Grabar, David Lopez & Andrea Basham, A Look Under the Hood of Spo-
tify’s Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 26,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/a-look-under-the-hood-of-spotifys-di
rect-listing/ [https://perma.cc/N6C2-RPAF]; Andrew Brady, Phyllis Korff & Michael
Zeidel, New NYSE Rules for Non-IPO Listings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Feb. 24, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/24/new-nyse-rules-
for-non-ipo-listings/ [https://perma.cc/2H65-9KDR]; Marc D. Jaffe, Greg Rodgers, and Ho-
racio Gutierrez, Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing, HARV. L.
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 5, 2018), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2018/07/05/spotify-case-study-structuring-and-executing-a-direct-listing/
[https://perma.cc/L5HG-ZACU]. Further, Attorney David N. Feldman does devote a chap-
ter in his book on Regulation A+ to the mechanics of a direct listing. See DAVID N. FELD-
MAN, REGULATION A+ AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO A TRADITIONAL IPO: FINANCING
YOUR GROWTH BUSINESS FOLLOWING THE JOBS ACT 117 (2018).
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tions on communications, (4) required NYSE filings, (5) role of
investment banks, and (6) cost. Those elements are set out in detail in
Parts II and III below and are summarized in Chart 1 below (together
with a column setting out how Spotify’s direct listing differed from a pure
direct listing26).
Chart 1. Traditional IPO and Direct Listing Compared27
Direct Listing Direct Listing
IPO (Pure) (Spotify)
Purpose Raise capital, Liquidity, Liquidity,
liquidity, consideration for consideration for
consideration for later acquisitions later acquisitions
later acquisitions
Required SEC Securities Act Exchange Act Securities Act
filings registration registration registration
statement (S-1) statement (Form statement (F-1)
followed by 10) followed by
Exchange Act Exchange Act
registration registration
statement (8-A) statement (8-A)
Restrictions on Quiet period No restrictions Quiet period
communications applies applies
Required NYSE Listing application Listing application Listing application
filings
Role of Underwriter Financial advisor Financial advisor
investment banks
Amount $130.5 million28 N/A $35 million
exceptionally large (large companies
company pays to pay on average
investment bank $37 million)29
A. WHY GO PUBLIC BY TRADITIONAL IPO?
There are three reasons that a company goes public by IPO: (1) to raise
capital, (2) liquidity, and (3) the public shares can be used for later
acquisitions.
• Capital. The primary reason that a company engages in an IPO is to
26. For a definition of “pure direct listing,” see infra Section III.B.1.
27. Column “IPO” summarizes the characteristics of a traditional IPO, as explained in
more detail infra Part II. There are two columns for direct listing. The column labelled
“Direct Listing (Pure)” summarizes how a direct listing should work in theory as explained
in more detail infra Part III. The column labelled “Direct Listing (Spotify)” summarizes
how Spotify’s direct listing worked, as explained in more detail. See infra Part IV.
28. This number is the average of amounts paid to underwriters in the Snap Inc., IPO
and the Facebook Inc., IPO. See Snap Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 1 (March 1, 2017)
($85 million paid to underwriters); Facebook Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 1 (May 17,
2012) ($176 million paid to underwriters).
29. PWC DEALS, CONSIDERING AN IPO? AN INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS POST-JOBS
ACT 10 (2015).
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raise capital.30 A typical company can raise $100 million.31 Of
course, some IPOs are much, much larger. Snap, Inc.—the parent
of Snapchat, a picture messaging application— is a good example.32
Its March 2017 IPO raised $3.4 billion.33
• Liquidity. Once a company goes public, early investors have a mar-
ketplace—e.g., NYSE or NASDAQ—where they can sell their
shares.34 This ability to readily transform stock into cash is called
liquidity.35 A market is considered more liquid when shares can be
sold without causing a major drop in price (i.e., there must be a
large number of units traded on the given exchange, or more pre-
cisely, a large float).36
• Consideration for Acquisitions. Because publicly listed shares are
liquid, they can be used like cash. This is important if a company
wants to acquire another company.37
B. THE ROLE OF THE UNDERWRITER38
The mechanics of an IPO are governed by the Securities Act of 1933.39
They are well understood, and I will simply provide a brief summary
here, focusing on the role of the underwriter.
The statutory definition of “underwriter” paints a picture of a middle
man.40 According to the Securities Act of 1933, an underwriter is a per-
son that “offers or sells for an issuer.”41 In the traditional firm commit-
ment underwriting, the “underwriter purchases the securities from the
issuer . . . at a discount and then resells them to the public at a set public
offering price.”42
But the underwriter is more than a passive middle man.43 First, the
30. A. C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and
Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2013).
31. Lia Der Marderosian, 2017 IPO Report, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE. & FIN. REG. 3 (May 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/25/2017-ipo-
report/ [https://perma.cc/AH9N-BW64].
32. Snap Inc., Prospectus, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 EN-
TREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 649, 661–62 (2008).
35. Alessio M. Pacces, Illiquidity and Financial Crisis, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 383, 390
(2013).
36. Ariel Yehezkel, Foreign Corporations Listing in the United States: Does Law Mat-
ter? Testing the Israeli Phenomenon, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 351, 370 (2006).
37. Coffee, supra note 3.
38. This section discusses the role of the underwriter vis-a`-vis duties and obligations to
the issuer. For a discussion of the role of underwriter vis-a`-vis duties and obligations to the
investor, see the discussion of underwriter as gatekeeper, infra Part V.
39. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11).
41. Id.
42. Jennifer O’Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Lia-
bility Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 217, 218 n.5 (1996).
43. See Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securi-
ties Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 335–36 (2011).
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underwriter must engage in “book building.”44 It is called book building
because the underwriter reaches out to potential purchasers (most of
whom are institutional investors that have a prior relationship with the
underwriter) to gauge interest in the offering (how many shares they will
purchase, and at what price), and “records this information in a meta-
phorical ‘book’.”45 The underwriter and issuer use the book to decide at
what price to offer the securities.46
Further, the shares (usually) don’t sell themselves. Many times, the
company going public is not a household name.47 As such, the under-
writer actively markets the issuer’s shares in a series of meetings with
large institutional investors (including road shows).48 The road show is an
opportunity for the underwriter to educate prospective investors about
the company, and the company’s prospects going forward.49
The underwriter also assists with the required filings.50 It assists the
issuing company as it prepares its Securities Act registration statement
(Form S-1).51 Only after the registration statement is filed with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may the shares be offered for sale
(but still not sold).52 And only after the registration statement is declared
effective by the SEC may the shares actually be sold.53
Finally, the underwriter is instrumental in setting the price for the
IPO.54 This is a difficult task.55 The underwriter “must consider the size
of the offering, the nature and prospects of the issuer’s business, its assets
and earnings, management expertise, and the markets in which it com-
petes.”56 Of course, another important factor is demand for the security,
which the underwriter is in the best position to gauge (remember it is the
underwriter that is gauging demand during road shows).57 The under-
writer will work with the issuing company to set a final price.58
44. Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Struc-
tures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1594 (2006).
45. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Untold Story of Underwriting Compensation Regula-
tion, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 629 (2010).
46. Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the United
States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369, 373 (2007).
47. Sjostrom, supra note 45.
48. Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: Legal and Economic Analysis of the
Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 613
(2004).
49. Sjostrom, supra note 45, at 629 n.13.
50. Jeremy McClane, The Agency Costs of Teamwork, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1229,
1240 (2016).
51. Id. at 1242.
52. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
53. Id.
54. Shane A. Corwin & Paul Schultz, The Role of the IPO Underwriting Syndicates:
Pricing Information Production, and Underwriter Competition, 60 J. FIN. 443, 448 (2005).
55. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 654 (1988).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Jeremy R. McClane, The Sum of Its Parts: The Lawyer-Client Relationship in Ini-
tial Public Offerings, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 131, 142 (2015).
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In return for its work, the underwriter earns its fee (sometimes referred
to as “the spread, the difference between the price that the dealer (under-
writer) acquired the stock from the issuer and the amount it receives
when selling that same stock to the public”).59 That fee, which can be as
high as seven percent,60 as well as the other costs to the issuer of going
public, will be discussed in the following section.
C. THE COST
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the average costs associ-
ated with a large IPO (defined as offerings greater than $301 million)
total over $44 million.61 The lion’s share of the cost, $37 million, goes to
the underwriter for its work.62 And those fees can go substantially higher
(consider that Facebook paid over $176 million to its underwriters).63
Substantial fees are also paid to the accountants for auditing work, and
the attorneys that assist the company in preparing the disclosure docu-
ments, ferreting out omissions or misstatements.64 The particulars are set
forth in the chart below.
Chart 2. Average Large IPO Costs65




Legal Fees and Expenses $3,100,000
Transfer Agent and Registrar Fees N/A
Underwriter Fee $37,000,000
Miscellaneous Fees and Expenses $1,600,000
TOTAL $44,350,000
D. THE DECREASE IN TRADITIONAL IPOS
The IPO craze reached its zenith in the 1990s (peaking in 1996).67 To-
day, fewer companies are going public by IPO.68 The decrease in IPOs is
59. Thompson, supra note 43, at 336.
60. Id.; see Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN.
1105, 1105 (2000) (underwriters usually charge a seven percent commission).
61. PWC DEALS, supra note 29.
62. Id.
63. Facebook, Inc., Prospectus, supra note 28.
64. McClane, supra note 58, at 140.
65. PWC DEALS, supra note 61, at 10.
66. Id. at 8.
67. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1077
n.244 (2012).
68. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Irrepressible Myth that SEC Overregulation Has Chilled
IPOs, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 29, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/
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illustrated by the chart below.
Chart 3. IPOs By Year69
Numerous authors have discussed the possible reasons for the reduc-
tion in IPOs.70 One reason is that companies can raise large amounts of
capital in private placements.71 Professor de Fontenay describes the
change thus: “[b]y repeatedly loosening the restrictions on capital raising
and trading on the private side, securities regulators have given birth to a
05/29/the-irrepressible-myth-that-sec-overregulation-has-chilled-ipos [https://perma.cc/
2E7W-9Q6Q]; see Gerald F. Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation? Uber-
ization and the Web Page Enterprise, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 501, 503 (2016) (“It has been
almost twenty years since the peak of the 1990s IPO wave, but there is no reason to expect
a revival. There were fewer IPOs in the six years from 2009 to 2014 than there were in 1996
alone.”).
69. This chart includes number of IPOs as measured by Professor Ritter at University
of Florida, JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: UPDATED STATISTICS 22, tbl. 6
(2018), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2018/01/IPOs2017Statistics_January17_
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VBR-PL6F], and as measured by Lia Der Marderosian. See
Marderosian, supra note 31, at 2. The difference appears to be caused by the fact that
Professor Ritter excludes IPOs with an offer price under $8.00, ADRs, unit offers, closed-
end funds, REITs, natural resource limited partnerships, small best efforts offers, banks
and S&Ls, and stocks not listed on CRSP (CRSP includes Amex, NYSE, and NASDAQ
stocks).
70. The most plausible explanation is deregulation of private offerings coupled with
over-regulation of public offerings. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private
Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 447 (2017). Others
discount the role of over-regulation. See Coffee, supra note 67, at 1076–77 (“neither the
Dodd-Frank Act nor Section 404 of SOX could have caused this decline in IPOs, which
dates back, at least, to the burst of the Internet IPO bubble in 2001”); Paul Rose & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 87 (2016) (finding that the decline of IPOs is a result of market
forces independent of regulation).
71. De Fontenay, supra note 70; see Davis, supra note 68, at 504 (discussing the grow-
ing ease of raising capital privately).
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contradiction in terms: private securities markets.”72 She traces the
growth of the private securities markets from the promulgation of Regu-
lation D in 1982, which allowed companies to offer unregistered securities
to accredited investors, to the promulgation of Rule 144 in 1990, which
allowed those securities to trade on the secondary market.73 She also
points to 1996 amendments to the Investment Company Act that allowed
for the creation of “mega private equity funds.”74
At the same time that it was getting easier to raise capital on the pri-
vate securities markets, public companies were facing increased costs of
complying with disclosure requirements. Sarbanes-Oxley increased dis-
closure obligations, and therefore costs.75 CEO and CFO certification re-
quirements added significant expense to the disclosure process.76 Dodd-
Frank also added expense.77
In short, raising capital became easier via the private markets, at the
same time it became more difficult (and more expensive) via the public
markets.78 The result is that companies that traditionally used IPOs to
raise large amounts of capital now use private placements.79 For example,
in 2015, Airbnb raised $1.5 billion in a private funding round.80 In 2016,
Spotify raised $1 billion in a private funding round.81
An interesting corollary is that as IPOs have decreased, so have the
total number of listed firms. As IPOs have not kept pace with firms leav-
ing the exchanges through going-private transactions, delisting, bank-
ruptcy, etc., the total number of publicly traded firms has declined.82
III. GOING PUBLIC BY DIRECT LISTING
As discussed above, less companies are engaging in IPOs to raise capi-
72. De Fontenay, supra note 70, at 448.
73. Id. at 467–68.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 463–64.
76. Id.
77. Carlos Berdejo, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (2015)
(citing Oesterle, supra note 46, at 370). Companies report to the Treasury that increased
regulation, including Dodd-Frank, made IPOs less attractive. See U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY,
A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES—CAPITAL MARKETS 26
(2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-Sys
tem-Capital-Markets-FINAL-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB6L-96A5].
78. De Fontenay, supra note 70.
79. Id.
80. Telis Demos, Airbnb Raises $1.5 Billion in One of Largest Private Placements,
WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-1-5-billion-in-one-
of-largest-private-placements-1435363506.
81. Coffee, supra note 3.
82. See de Fontenay, supra note 70, at 456–57 (“[B]etween 1977 and 2012 the number
of U.S. exchange-listed firms fell in absolute terms from 4710 to 4102 firms, representing a
decline of almost thirteen percent. However, both the U.S. population and the total num-
ber of U.S. firms grew significantly during this time.”) (citing Craig Doidge et. al., The U.S.
Listing Gap 5 (Sept. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Journal of Financial
Economics)).
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tal.83 Instead they are raising capital in private placements.84 Yet these
companies still must go public at some point, if not to raise capital, then
to provide liquidity to early investors (and some key employees) as well
as to obtain consideration to use in future acquisitions.85 It is these com-
panies—tech unicorns like Spotify—that are prime candidates for direct
listings on a national exchange.
A. WHY GO PUBLIC BY DIRECT LISTING?
Part II of this Article explained that one of the primary reasons to go
public by IPOs is to raise capital.86 But in a direct listing, no capital is
raised (the company already raised large amounts of capital in private
placements).87 Instead, the primary motivation for a direct listing is li-
quidity.88 Liquidity is more than shareholders being able to sell their
stock for cash (after all, even those that received their stock in private
offerings can sell their shares pursuant to Rule 144 if they have been held
for in excess of six months, or twelve months, as the case may be).89 In-
stead, liquidity is the ability to sell stock for cash easily.90
Private securities markets (an admittedly self-contradictory term)91
have never been entirely workable.92 While there are some private place-
ment markets, such as NASDAQ Private Market, which “clear[ ] trades
and confirm[ ] accredited-investor status”93 it is limited to mostly institu-
tional investors (i.e., they want to buy huge blocks of shares).94 Further,
the success of these private markets has been limited.95 As one commen-
tator wrote:
The idea of relying on a Private Placement Market dates back to
2008, when Private Placement Markets seemed like they would be
the Next Big Thing, because they would provide a venue for the re-
sale of shares in companies that were not ready or not inclined to go
public. But they have not flourished, and Spotify—a hot pre-IPO
ticket if ever there was one—said in its prospectus that there has not
been a recent sustained history of trading its shares in a private
placement market.96
83. See supra Section II.D.
84. See id.
85. Coffee, supra note 3.
86. See supra Section II.A.
87. Coffee, supra note 3.
88. Id.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(i)–(ii) (2017).
90. Pacces, supra note 35.
91. See de Fontenay, supra note 70, at 448 (“By repeatedly loosening the restrictions
on capital raising and trading on the private side, securities regulators have given birth to a
contradiction in terms: private securities markets.”).
92. Grabar, Lopez & Basham, supra note 25, § 10.
93. De Fontenay, supra note 70, at 470.
94. Robert Pozen, Spotify’s Direct Listing Strikes Right Note for Unicorns Riding High,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2018, at 18.
95. Grabar, Lopez & Basham, supra note 25, § 10.
96. Id.
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And so, as Professor de Fontenay points out, when it comes to liquidity,
there is really no substitute for the public markets.97 If a firm wants to
achieve true liquidity, they need to be listed on a national exchange, if not
by IPO, then by direct listing.
Second, as explained below, a direct listing allows a company to
achieve liquidity for its stock at a significantly lower cost than an IPO,
because the company does not need to hire an underwriter.98
Third, once a company goes public by direct listing, it can raise capital
later on favorable terms.99 Firms that go public by IPO often leave capital
on the table, suffering from on average twenty percent underpricing (that
is what gives rise to the typical first day “pop”).100 On the other hand,
“when firms whose stock is already traded publicly raise capital, their un-
derpricing is essentially negligible.”101
Fourth, once the company’s stock is publicly traded, it can “buy it back,
on the stock exchange, at the market price, without negotiating privately
with investors.”102 The advantages of a stock buyback by a cash rich firm
are well documented.103
Considering all of the foregoing, the best candidates for direct listings
are tech unicorns that already raised massive amounts of capital in pri-
vate placements.104 They don’t need to raise more capital, but they do
want to provide liquidity to their investors.105 I add to those considera-
tions that they need to have sufficient shares to maintain a liquid market,
be mature and “sufficiently well known to garner equity research cover-
age after [their] listing.”106
Candidates for direct listing going forward include Airbnb, Pinterest,
and Uber.107 When one considers their valuations ($31 billion, $12.3 bil-
lion, and $62.5 billion, respectively),108 it is clear that billions of dollars in
investor cash (both institutional and individual) will be implicated.109
97. See de Fontenay, supra note 70, at 470 (“The fundamental characteristic of publicly
traded stock, that . . . could never be replicated with private company stock, is liquidity”).
98. See infra Section III.D (discussing cost savings in theory); see also infra Section
IV.C (discussing whether cost savings materialized in the Spotify direct listing).
99. Kecske´s, supra note 23.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Matt Levine, Going Public to Buy Back Stock, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:31
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-06/going-public-to-buy-back-
stock.
103. Ok-Rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 425, 431–51 (2002).
104. Coffee, supra note 3.
105. Id.
106. James Dean, Spotify Calls the Tune with Low-Cost Float, THE TIMES, Jan. 29, 2018,
at 40. Although on this last point, it may be provided by the financial advisor to the direct
listing.
107. Osterland, supra note 9.
108. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Seeking the True Value of Unicorns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2017, at B1.
109. Osterland, supra note 9.
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B. DIRECT LISTING MECHANICS
1. The Securities Laws (A “Pure” Direct Listing)
Securities law scholars well understand the mechanics of the traditional
IPO. As Jeff Schwartz stated, “[t]he traditional IPO, which launches a
company onto the NYSE or NASDAQ and into the sweet-spot of securi-
ties regulation, is well-trodden and familiar.”110 On the other hand, the
mechanics of a direct listing? Not so well-trodden. Not so familiar.
To understand the mechanics of a direct listing, one must understand
that the Securities Laws call for numerous kinds of registration state-
ments.111 Below, I provide some clarification:
(1) The Securities Act registration statement (Form S-1) is used when
a company is conducting an IPO.112
(2) The Securities Act registration statement (Form S-1) may also be
used when a person receives shares in a private placement and wants to
resell them (which, depending on the timing, the SEC may consider a
distribution).113 In this case, it is referred to as a “resale registration state-
ment” or “selling shareholder registration statement.”114
(3) The Exchange Act registration statement (Form 10) is used when a
company is listing shares on an exchange pursuant to Section 12(b) of the
Exchange Act of 1934.115 Note that to not be considered a distribution,
these shares must have been held for the applicable holding period set
forth in Rule 144.116
(4) A shortened Exchange Act registration statement (Form 8-A) may
be used if a company already filed a Securities Act registration statement
(Form S-1).117
In this Article, I will refer to Securities Act registration statements
(numbers 1 and 2 above), and Exchange Act registration statements
(numbers 3 and 4 above).
For a “pure” direct listing, the company files an Exchange Act registra-
110. Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 564
(2012).
111. For a discussion of the role of various filings in the direct listing, see FELDMAN,
supra note 25, at 117–27 (referring to a direct listing as a self-filing).
112. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2017) (“This Form [S-1] shall be used for the registration
under the Securities Act of 1933 of securities of all registrants for which no other form is
authorized or prescribed”).
113. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 381, 394 (2007).
114. Brady, Korff & Zeidel, supra note 25.
115. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (2017) (“This form shall be used for registration pursuant
to section 12(b) or (g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of classes of securities of
issuers for which no other form is prescribed.”); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The
Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 743, 753–54 (2008) (“any
company can go public . . . through a ‘self-filing,’ i.e., voluntarily filing an Exchange Act
registration statement with the SEC”).
116. Coffee, supra note 3 (citing Rule 144(c)(1) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)(i)));
see also FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 119–20 (discussing the role of Rule 144 in direct
listings).
117. WILMERHALE, IPO REPORT 25 (2018), https://www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/fc137
5c8e4cd4719b3a97b713e3632b8.pdf [https://perma.cc/73NJ-T66R].
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tion statement only, a Form 10.118 In fact, in writing about direct listings,
Professor Coffee points out that “there is no inherent statutory obligation
to register these shares under the Securities Act of 1933, because the is-
suer is not making any sale.”119 The shares begin trading immediately
upon the Exchange Act registration statement’s effectiveness.120 (It is
worth pointing out that Spotify’s direct listing, for reasons discussed be-
low, was not pure. It was required by the NYSE and SEC to do much
more than file an Exchange Act registration statement.121)
From a paperwork perspective, an Exchange Act registration statement
is just as time-consuming as a Securities Act registration statement.122 As
Professor Sjostrom points out:
An Exchange Act registration statement requires extensive disclo-
sures including a description of the company’s business operations,
risk factors, finances, properties, and management. Additionally, the
registration statement must include audited financial statements for
the last two or three years. Putting together this disclosure for an
operating company takes some time—typically, at least sixty days.
Further, the registration statement does not become effective until
sixty days after filing and may be scrutinized by the SEC prior to
effectiveness, resulting in required revisions. Hence, it will take a
company at least four months from deciding to pursue a self-filing to
the registration statement becoming effective and various securities
regulation clocks tied to effectiveness will not start running.123
Further, if a company goes public with an Exchange Act registration
statement (as compared to a Securities Act registration statement) similar
amounts are paid to lawyers and accountants.124 The difference—and the
savings—comes from the fact that a direct listing does not require an ex-
pensive underwriter.125
Another difference is that using an Exchange Act registration state-
ment may avoid the Securities Act’s limits on communications.126 Com-
pare this with a traditional IPO, where the issuing company is subject to a
quiet period during which it cannot make any statements that condition
the mind of the investing public.127
118. Coffee, supra note 3.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See infra Section III.B.2.
122. Sjostrom, supra note 115.
123. Id. at 754.
124. Robert Pozen, Shiva Rajgopal & Robert Stoumbos, Here’s How a Hot Company
Can Go Public Without an IPO, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 7, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://www
.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-a-hot-company-can-go-public-without-an-ipo-2017-12-
07 [https://perma.cc/PM4X-GX64].
125. Farrell, Osipovich & Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut, supra note 1 (“[Spotify] saved
tens of millions of dollars in fees while still giving its employees and early investors the
chance to cash out.”).
126. See Osipovich & Farrell, NYSE Pins Hopes, supra note 1, at B1 (stating there is no
quiet period for a direct listing); Lionel Barber, Spotify: Shush, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2018,
at 1 (suggesting that Spotify is using a direct listing to avoid a quiet period).
127. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
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2. NYSE Listed Company Manual and the SEC (Moving Away From
a “Pure” Direct Listing)
A plain reading of the Exchange Act gives the appearance that a direct
listing is a fairly simple procedure.128 It appears that a company could
simply (1) file an Exchange Act registration statement, and (2) file a list-
ing application with the NYSE.129 However, as to the second point, the
NYSE Listed Company Manual was far from clear on the procedure.130 It
did “not make any provision for a company listing in connection with the
effectiveness of an Exchange Act registration statement.”131
In early 2017, NYSE readily went to work amending rule 102.01B,132 to
explicitly provide that it allows a company to list upon effectiveness of an
Exchange Act registration statement.133 However, the NYSE cannot
change its rules without the approval of the SEC.134 It is here that the
matter gets more complicated and moves away from what I will call a
pure direct listing.
On March 13, 2017, the NYSE filed with the SEC a proposed rule
change.135 The NYSE proposed that the text of Footnote (E) to Section
102.01B be changed to add the following italicized language:
(E) Generally, the Exchange expects to list companies in connection
with a firm commitment underwritten IPO . . . . However, the Ex-
change recognizes that some companies that have not previously had
their common equity securities registered under the Exchange Act,
but which have sold common equity securities in a private place-
ment, may wish to list their common equity securities on the Ex-
change at the time of effectiveness of a registration statement filed
solely for the purpose of allowing existing shareholders to sell their
shares. Similarly, some companies that have not previously had their
common equity securities registered under the Exchange Act may wish
to list immediately upon effectiveness of an Exchange Act registration
statement without any concurrent IPO or Securities Act registration.
Consequently, the Exchange will, on a case by case basis, exercise
discretion to list companies whose stock is not previously registered
under the Exchange Act, where such a company is listing without a
related underwritten offering (i) upon effectiveness of a registration
statement registering only the resale of shares sold by the company
in earlier private placements or (ii) upon effectiveness of an Ex-
128. Coffee, supra note 3.
129. Id.
130. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 102.01B (2003) [hereinafter Listed
Company Manual].
131. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend Section 102.01B, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-80313, 2017 WL 1132113, *4 (Mar. 27, 2017) [hereinafter No-
tice of Proposed Rule Change].
132. See Farrell, Osipovich & Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut, supra note 1 (“The New
York Stock Exchange . . . worked closely with Spotify over the past year to enable the
unorthodox listing”).
133. Notice of Proposed Rule Change, supra note 131.
134. Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2012); Exchange Act Rule
19b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b–4(f), (n) (2017).
135. Notice of Proposed Rule Change, supra note 131, at *1.
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change Act registration statement without any concurrent IPO or Se-
curities Act registration.136
The italicized amendments (if approved by the SEC) would have al-
lowed a company to begin trading upon the approval of an Exchange Act
registration statement (what I refer to as a pure direct listing above).137
However, the SEC believed that in order to protect investors,138 a Securi-
ties Act registration statement should be filed (even though there was no
sale by the company) before an Exchange Act registration statement.139
It was this more stringent process—requiring a Securities Act registration
statement be filed and then an Exchange Act registration statement be
filed—that was eventually adopted.140 The SEC explained that this more
stringent process was a compromise meant to protect investors in two
ways.141 First, by requiring a Securities Act registration statement, the
issuer is made subject to Section 11 liability for material misstatements
(although, as discussed below, there is no underwriter to hold liable).142
Second, by requiring a Securities Act registration statement, the Securi-
ties Act’s limits on communications while the company is waiting for ap-
proval from the SEC also apply.143 The Council of Institutional Investors
applauded the compromise:
We strongly support the NYSE’s decision to remove a provision from
an earlier version of the proposed rule “that would have allowed a
company to list immediately upon effectiveness of an [Securities] Ex-
136. E-mail from Martha Redding, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NYSE, to Brent J. Fields,
Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 1, 2017), at Exhibit 5 (setting out proposed rule text), https://www.sec
.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2017-30/nyse201730-2161992-157779.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSL3-
XQ7Y].
137. Brady, Korff & Zeidel, supra note 25.
138. Farrell & Steele, Spotify Registers, supra note 1 (“The SEC had concerns that Spo-
tify’s direct listing could open the door for other companies with potentially risky financial
profiles to access the public markets without giving investors sufficient protection”).
139. Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval
of Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-82627, 3 n.11 (Feb. 2, 2018) [here-
inafter Order Granting Accelerated Approval] (“Amendment No. 3 revised the proposal
to eliminate the proposed changes to Footnote (E) that would have allowed a company to
list immediately upon effectiveness of an Exchange Act registration statement only, with-
out any concurrent IPO or Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) registration.”).
140. See id. at 18–20.
141. Id. at 12–14 (“[T]he proposed rule change will provide a means for a category of
companies with securities that have not previously been traded on a public market and that
are listing only upon effectiveness of a selling shareholder registration statement, without a
related underwritten offering, and without recent trading in a Private Placement Market,
to list on the Exchange.”).
142. E-mail from Jeffrey P. Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Mahoney Letter], https://www.sec
.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2017-30/nyse201730-3128154-161930.pdf [https://perma.cc/X39P-
NCL4]; see Robert Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1264 (2003) (“While a typical issuer focuses disproportionately
more attention on preparing a Securities Act registration statement than Exchange Act
registration statements or reports, that disparity reflects the difference in potential liability
exposure, not the difference in the comprehensiveness of the ‘disclosure obligations.’”).
143. Mahoney Letter, supra note 142; see Brady, Korff & Zeidel, supra note 25 (“[The]
resale registration statement . . . will be subject to traditional review and comment process
of the SEC staff.”).
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change Act [of 1934] registration statement only, without any con-
current . . . Securities Act of 1933 . . . registration.” This change in
the proposed rule would appropriately require a company in a direct
listing to file a resale registration that “will be subject to traditional
review and comment process of the SEC staff . . . [and] issuers . . .
will need to consider the application of the gun-jumping and liability
provisions of the Securities Act.” We believe requiring a concurrent
Securities Act registration is critical to ensuring that direct listings do
not compromise investor protections.144
Another reason that the SEC may have required a Securities Act regis-
tration statement—although this is somewhat foggy in the back-and-forth
regarding adoption of the rule—is that a pure direct listing presupposes
that the stock is being sold by a person other than an issuer, underwriter
or dealer.145 However, for some companies interested in a direct listing, a
portion of the stock held by the selling shareholders may not have been
held for the required amount of time (a person that has not held for the
required amount of time is deemed an underwriter).146 The SEC may
have felt that to avoid this pitfall, it is advisable to require a direct listing
company to use a Securities Act resale registration statement (Form S-1)
for a direct listing.147 This bifurcated approach was summed up by one
commentator:
Thus, under the amended rules, a direct listing will require a com-
pany to file a resale registration statement for at least some amount
of its outstanding shares, which will be subject to traditional review
and comment process of the SEC staff . . . . Public resales . . . not
covered by the resale registration statement must be conducted in
accordance with the applicable conditions of Securities Act Rule
144.148
144. Mahoney Letter, supra note 142.
145. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012) (exempting from re-
gistration a sale “by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer”); Rule 144(d),
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (2017) (safe harbor clarifying that an underwriter is not a person
that holds for longer than six months, or one year, as the case may be). This view is re-
flected in a letter from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP to the SEC:
We begin by addressing the SEC’s question regarding “the role of various
distribution participants.” That assessment should be made within the frame-
work for registration established by the Securities Act and the rules thereun-
der, including in particular Rule 144. Where the only stockholders eligible to
sell their shares following a direct listing are non-affiliates that have held
their shares at least one year, those sales and any related offering activity
should be exempt from Securities Act registration under Section 4(a)(1), as
implemented, in the case of restricted securities, by the non-exclusive safe
harbor provided by Rule144(b)(1).
Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Oct.
12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2017-30/nyse201730-2638121-161267.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VRR-G2CR].
146. Rule 144(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d).
147. Brady, Korff & Zeidel, supra note 25. If the company is foreign, it would use a
Form F-1 (this was the case for Spotify). See infra Section IV.A. One upside, “if a Form S-1
[or F-1] is filed, the company may file a [much simpler] Form 8-A instead of a Form 10 to
register its common stock under the Exchange Act.” WILMERHALE, supra note 117.
148. Brady, Korff & Zeidel, supra note 25.
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C. FROM UNDERWRITER TO FINANCIAL ADVISOR
While a direct listing does not require an underwriter, the NYSE rules
do require the continued participation of investment banks as financial
advisors. As a result, the paradigm shift is not so much away from invest-
ment banks altogether, as it is a change in the role played by the invest-
ment bank—from underwriter to financial advisor.
First, the financial advisor assists with valuation.149 The NYSE Listed
Company Manual provides that for a company to direct list, it must first
submit a valuation in excess of $250 million.150 The Listed Company
Manual further provides that the valuation must be provided by an entity
that has “experience” and “demonstrable competence” in providing valu-
ations.151 That is to say, it must be provided by an investment bank.
Second, the financial advisor must assist and advise the designated
market maker (DMM) in setting an opening price.152 Rule 104 states that
“the DMM will consult with a financial advisor to the issuer of such se-
curity in order to effect a fair and orderly opening of such security.”153
Financial advisors do serve other purposes. They provide advice and
assistance in filing the S-1, and drafting investor presentations.154 How-
ever, that is the extent of the financial advisor’s role. The financial advi-
sor does not perform traditional underwriting duties such as book
building, marketing and selling, or stabilizing.155 As discussed below, this
has major implications regarding whether the financial advisor is incen-
tivized to perform its gatekeeper role.156
D. COST
One of the purported advantages of a direct listing is that it is less ex-
pensive than an IPO. That is because no new shares are being issued, and
thus no expensive underwriter is needed to make a market.157 (Remem-
ber, the underwriter accounts for 83% of the cost of a large IPO.158) This
claim is complicated by the fact that, while it is true that an investment
bank is not needed to act as underwriter, investment banks are still in-
volved as financial advisors to the company engaged in the direct list-
ing.159 However, advising is not as involved (or risky) as acting as an
underwriter, meaning that in a direct listing, the investment bank “will
149. Listed Company Manual, supra note 130, at § 102.01B n.(E).
150. Id.
151. Id.




154. That is what they did for Spotify. See infra Section IV.A.
155. See infra Part V.
156. See id.
157. Coffee, supra note 3.
158. See discussion supra Section II.C.
159. Listed Company Manual, supra note 130, at § 102.01B n.(E); NYSE, Inc., Rules,
supra note 152, at Rules 15, 104.
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not have any justification for the standard 7 percent discount when it is
not selling any shares.”160
IV. SPOTIFY’S DIRECT LISTING
In this Part, Spotify’s direct listing is used as a case study. Spotify was a
perfect candidate for a direct listing.161 Pre-direct listing it had 178.1 mil-
lion shares outstanding—privately traded—and was valued in excess of
$20 billion.162 It had no need to raise any additional capital, but it did
need to go public in order to provide liquidity to early investors (and
some key employees), as well as to obtain consideration to use in future
acquisitions.163
While I classify providing liquidity for early investors as the primary
driver of Spotify’s direct listing, Professor Coffee writes that the ability to
use stock for future acquisitions was likely the primary driver:
After a stock is listed on the NYSE (either by a traditional IPO or a
direct listing), an issuer seeking to acquire a rival in a merger will
only need to file a Form S-4 registration statement (and should be
able to qualify for automatic shelf registration). In the hyper-com-
petitive environment in which many unicorns find themselves, it is
eat or be eaten, acquire or be acquired, and the capacity to use stock
for a merger may be the leading reason that unicorns will eventually
decide to go public.164
Whatever the primary reason—liquidity or consideration for acquisi-
tions—on April 3, 2018, Spotify went public by direct listing its existing
shares on the NYSE.165 To date, Spotify is the only large company to
have done so (prior direct listings involved small companies, and usually
resulted in the company trading on the over the counter (OTC) market166
160. Coffee, supra note 3.
161. See supra Section III.A (discussing who can use a direct listing).
162. See Farrell & Steele, Spotify Registers, supra note 1 (reporting the valuation at $20
billion); Farrell, Spotify to Sell, supra note 1 (reporting 178.1 million shares outstanding);
McClane, supra note 24 (discussing Spotify’s $20 billion valuation).
163. Coffee, supra note 3.
164. Id.
165. Farrell, Osipovich & Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut, supra note 1.
166. Alexander Panisch, Spotify’s IP-Faux: Direct Listings and the Future of Initial Pub-
lic Offerings, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2018), https://news.law.fordham
.edu/jcfl/2018/04/19/spotifys-ip-faux-direct-listings-and-the-future-of-initial-public-offerings
[https://perma.cc/4RQB-4BR9]; see Schwartz, supra note 110, at 569–70 (“Up until very
recently, engaging in [direct listing] meant a company’s shares would trade on the OTC
Bulletin Board”). One notable example of a company engaging in a direct listing and then
trading on the OTC Bulletin Board is OvaScience: “To date, few companies have com-
pleted Form 10 IPOs, and the extent to which this market will broaden remains to be seen.
One notable Form 10 IPO success story is that of OvaScience, a life sciences company
developing proprietary products to improve the treatment of female infertility. Shortly af-
ter formation in April 2011, OvaScience raised $6.2 million in venture capital financing. In
March 2012, OvaScience raised an additional $37.2 million through a placement agent.
OvaScience filed a Form 10 registration statement in April 2012, becoming a public report-
ing company in June 2012, and a Form S-1 resale registration statement in August 2012,
and its common stock began to trade on the OTC Bulletin Board in November 2012.”
David Westenberg et. al., 2013 IPO Report, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/united
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or NASDAQ167).
A. MECHANICS
Spotify was subject to the more complicated direct listing rules dis-
cussed above (i.e., it was not a pure direct listing).168 It was required to
file a Securities Act registration statement followed by an Exchange Act
registration statement.169 As such, Spotify began by filing a Securities Act
registration statement (Form F-1 because it is domiciled in Luxembourg)
on February 28, 2018.170 It then worked with the SEC over the course of
the next month to make changes to its Securities Act registration
statement.171
To finalize the direct listing, on March 21, 2018, Spotify filed an Ex-
change Act registration statement (Form 8-A), registering its securities
under Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act.172 Its shares began trading on
April 3, 2018.173
Spotify hired Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, and Allen
& Co. as financial advisors (hereinafter Goldman et. al.).174 They pro-
vided advice and assistance in preparing the SEC filings, and drafting in-
vestor presentations.175 Related to the second, Spotify conducted an
investor day on March 15, 2018 that looked like a traditional IPO road-
show.176 Executives talked about the company’s history, as well as its
plans moving forward.177 They discussed the company’s finances and an-
states/x/239184/acquisitionıˆnance+LBOs+MBOs/2013+IPO+Report [https://perma.cc/
PYN4-MF8J] (last updated May 15, 2013). Spotify’s direct listing was very different from
OvaScience. For Spotify, listing on the OTC market would have been inappropriate. First,
Spotify is a much, much bigger company. Spotify did a direct listing when it was valued at
$20 billion, making it too large for the OTC markets. The typical OTC traded company has
a market cap around $10 million. J.W. Verret, Uber-ized Corporate Law: Toward a 21st
Century Corporate Governance for Crowdfunding and App-Based Investor Communica-
tions, 41 J. CORP. L. 927, 954 n.111 (2016).
167. “Nasdaq, the technology exchange, has overseen seven [direct listings] since 2006.
Of the seven only three are still traded—four have been delisted, two because they were
acquired.” Dean, supra note 106.
168. See supra Section III.B.2.
169. Order Granting Accelerated Approval, supra note 139, at 19–20.
170. Spotify Technology S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018). It
should be noted that it had also taken advantage of the SEC’s confidential review policy
and submitted draft registration statements on December 18, 2017, and again (amended)
on January 31, 2018. Grabar, Lopez & Basham, supra note 25, at § 3.
171. Letter from Josephine J. Tao, Assistant Dir., SEC Div. of Trading & Mkts, to Dana
G. Fleischman, Lathan & Watkins LLP (Mar. 23, 2018) (including appended Request Let-
ter from Fleischman to Tao (Mar. 23, 2018)) [hereinafter No Action Letter], https://www
.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2018/spotify-technology-032318-regm.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/3GWV-8LX5].
172. Spotify Technology S.A., Exchange Act Registration Statement (Form 8-A) (Mar.
21, 2018).
173. Farrell, Osipovich & Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut, supra note 1.
174. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Rule 424B4) 186 (Mar. 23, 2018).
175. No Action Letter, supra note 171, at 8–9.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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swered investor questions.178
On a parallel track with Spotify’s SEC filings was its NYSE filing.179 It
filed a listing application with the NYSE.180 Likewise, it had to meet the
minimum valuation of $250 million required by the new NYSE Listed
Company Manual section 102.01B, footnote (E).181 Spotify easily met
that requirement (it was valued in excess of $20 billion before the direct
listing).182
Taking all the foregoing together, as to mechanics, Spotify’s direct list-
ing looked like a traditional IPO. Spotify conducted an investor day
(much like a roadshow), filed a Securities Act registration statement, an
Exchange Act registration statement, and filed a listing application with
the NYSE.183 The major contrast with an IPO—besides the obvious fact
that no capital was raised—was the fact that no underwriter was used.
B. LIQUIDITY
The primary reason that Spotify went public was to provide early inves-
tors (those that had purchased in private placements) with increased li-
quidity.184 Ironically, prior to the direct listing, some analysts were
concerned that existing shareholders would not sell.185 One analyst
wrote: “We are anticipating unusual trading dynamics in the days and
weeks following the April 3 listing and are unsure how long before ade-
quate liquidity will be established.”186 This possibility was not lost on
Spotify. Its prospectus stated as the first risk of owning the shares:
“[Y]our ability to sell your ordinary shares [may be compromised by] . . .
the failure of an active, liquid, and orderly market for our ordinary shares
to develop or be sustained.”187
In fact, when Spotify’s shares first started trading on April 3, 2018, it
appeared that few shareholders wanted to sell (at least not at the quoted
178. Id.
179. Listed Company Manual, supra note 130, at § 701.00.
180. John Hancock, What’s Really So Different About Spotify’s Going Public?, FOLEY
HOAG LLP: IPO, THEN WHAT? (May 1, 2018), http://ipo.foleyhoag.com/2018/05/01/whats-
really-so-different-about-spotifys-going-public/ [https://perma.cc/S3K4-3AY9].
181. Listed Company Manual, supra note 130.
182. McClane, supra note 24; Farrell & Steele, Spotify Registers, supra note 1.
183. Hancock, supra note 180.
184. Farrell & Steele, Spotify Registers, supra note 1 (“The listing is being used as a way
for Spotify to give existing investors the chance to cash out but not to raise additional
funds.”); Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 185 (Mar. 23, 2018) (“there
has not been a recent sustained history of trading in our ordinary shares in a private place-
ment market prior to listing”).
185. Jeran Wittenstein & Drew Singer, Spotify Analysts Are Falling for a Stock that




187. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 7 (Mar. 23, 2018).
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price).188 However, that changed when several large investors warmed on
the idea.189 An orderly market in Spotify’s shares did eventually develop,
and its stock price increased from $135 to $178 over the six month period
from April 3 to October 3, 2018, with a healthy daily volume ranging
between 1 and 10 million shares.190 To put that number in context, ex-
changes define “low volume” as an average daily volume of fewer than
200,000 shares per day.191 Volume can be a good proxy for liquidity.192
C. COST
An important question is, did Spotify save money by engaging in a di-
rect listing? While there is some debate here,193 it does appear that Spo-
tify saved a significant amount of money by cutting out the
underwriter.194 We must determine the difference between what Spotify
would have paid (for an underwriter in a traditional IPO), and what a
financial advisor is paid for handling a direct listing.
First, how much would Spotify have paid underwriters if it engaged in
an IPO? A large company (defined as a company making an offering in
excess of $300 million) pays on average $37 million.195 However, Spotify
is an exceptionally large company. As such, a better comparison is Snap
or Facebook. Snap, which is about half the size of Spotify—but still
huge—paid $85 million to its underwriters.196 Facebook, which was about
three times the size of Spotify, paid over $176 million to its underwrit-
188. Tiernan Ray, Spotify’s Inefficient Market Could Persist for a While, BARRON’S
(Apr. 4, 2018 5:27 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/spotifys-inefficient-market-could-
persist-for-a-while-1522877241 [https://perma.cc/Q66K-RZBQ].
189. Farrell & Dulaney, Spotify’s Slump, supra note 1 (“On Wednesday, Sony Music
Entertainment, one of Spotify’s biggest shareholders, disclosed that it had sold 17.2% of its
10.2 million-share stake—or roughly 1% of Spotify’s shares outstanding—during the first
day of trading Tuesday.”).
190. Spotify Technology S.A. Ordinary Shares SPOT, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/
quote/XNYS:SPOT (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
191. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change to Modify
Fees, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56905, 2007 WL 4793068, *2 (Dec. 5, 2007).
192. Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1428 n.101 (1996).
193. Compare McClane, supra note 24 (“Another big advantage of avoiding bookbuild-
ing is that Spotify will save on underwriting fees”), with Matt Levine, Spotify Will Pay
Banks to Cut Out the Banks, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/view/articles/2018-01-16/spotify-will-pay-banks-to-cut-out-the-banks [https://perma
.cc/XUZ9-23T4] (“[T]he average U.S. IPO pays its bankers about $12 million. Spotify will
pay almost triple that not to IPO.”).
194. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 187 (Mar. 23, 2018); see
French, Kern, Morillon & Yore, supra note 23 (“The so-called ‘direct listing’ presented the
opportunity for Spotify to save millions of dollars in underwriter fees (and possibly sub-
stantially more in underpricing) while also providing liquidity for its existing shareholders
and increasing the prestige and reputation of the company.”).
195. PWC DEALS, supra note 29.
196. Snap Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 1 (Mar. 1, 2017); Farrell, Spotify Challenges,
supra note 1 (“ Snap Inc.[‘s] . . . valuation was about the same as Spotify’s currently, but it
paid banks a total of nearly $100 million. That was roughly 2.5% of what Snap raised, a
fairly typical fee for a marquee IPO, which is smaller than the overall average of as much
as 7%.”).
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ers.197 In comparison, Spotify probably would have paid somewhere
around $130 million (an average of the foregoing), although some have
suggested as high as $209 million,198 or even $300 million.199
Second, how much did Spotify pay to its financial advisors? That is dis-
closed in Spotify’s prospectus.200 The cost paid to “other advisors”—
which presumably included the investment banks—was $35 million.201
Chart 4. Cost of Spotify Direct Listing202
Dollars




Legal Fees and Expenses $5,544,965
Transfer Agent and Registrar Fees $73,806
Other Advisors Fees $35,000,000
Miscellaneous Fees and Expenses $2,000,972
TOTAL $45,719,000
In short, it appears that Spotify paid substantially less than what other
exceptionally large firms pay for an IPO, or as one commentator stated,
“Wall Street’s banks still made money—just not nearly as much as they
would have if the company had done a traditional IPO.”203
D. SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT DIRECT LISTINGS IN GENERAL, AND
SPOTIFY’S DIRECT LISTING IN PARTICULAR
Before moving on to why cutting out the underwriter from the going
public process endangers investors, it is important to list some takeaways
from Parts II and III:
(1) While a plain reading of the Exchange Act would seem to indicate
that a direct listing could be done relatively simply (by filing a Form 10),
197. Facebook, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 1 (May 17, 2012).
198. Professor McClane calculated the savings as follows: “The average commission is
around 7%, although marquee companies like Spotify can often negotiate lower rates (for
example, Facebook famously negotiated a fee of 1.1%, unheard of at the time). If, as some
have speculated, Spotify’s stock is worth $20 billion, a 7% commission would mean $1.3
billion to the underwriters. Even a 1.1% fee would mean[ ] that Spotify would be giving up
$209 million to underwriters. That seems quite high compared to the $30 million that the
company is paying Morgan Stanley and its other financial advisors.” McClane, supra note
24.
199. Stephen Wilmot, Spotify, Like Google, Wants to Reinvent the Tech IPO, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 5, 2017, 7:20 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/spotify-like-google-wants-to-rein
vent-the-tech-ipo-1512476451.
200. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 187 (Mar. 23, 2018).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Farrell, Osipovich & Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut, supra note 1.
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the reality is that the SEC used its power over the NYSE to increase what
is required.204 As a result—at least from the perspective of what must be
filed—a direct listing is similar to a traditional IPO.205 The primary differ-
ences that remain is that no capital is raised, and that no underwriter is
needed.206
(2) While underwriters are not used, investment banks are still needed
to act as financial advisors. They (1) assist with valuation, (2) assist the
designated market maker (DMM) in setting an opening price, (3) provide
advice and assistance in preparing filings, and (4) assist with drafting in-
vestor presentations.207
(3) A company can save a significant amount of money by engaging in a
direct listing.208 However, there is some disagreement here.209 Estimates
range from nothing to hundreds of millions of dollars.210 The reality is
probably somewhere in the middle.211
(4) While small in number, the companies that can use a direct listing
represent a significant amount of investment banking business.212 Direct
listing is really only appropriate for unicorns (private companies valued
in excess of $1 billion). However, while few, these companies have out-
sized influence based on their size.213
V. IS SPOTIFY’S DIRECT LISTING A RECIPE FOR
GATEKEEPER FAILURE?
A. GATEKEEPERS AND INVESTOR PROTECTION
Underwriters act as gatekeepers to the public exchanges.214 They allow
204. See supra Section III.B.2.
205. See supra Sections III.B.2, IV.A.
206. See supra Section III, III.C.
207. See supra Section III.C.
208. See supra Sections III.D, IV.C.
209. See supra Section IV.C.
210. See supra Sections III.D, IV.C.
211. See supra Section IV.C.
212. See supra Part III.
213. See id.
214. This view of underwriter as gatekeeper accepts that underwriters have a great deal
of power. In so doing, it rejects the “one-sided” view of negotiations between underwriter
and issuer, where the issuer has all the power to choose among several different underwrit-
ers. See Chitru S. Fernando, Vladimir A. Gatchev & Paul A. Spindt, Two-Sided Matching:
How Corporate Issuers and Their Underwriters Choose Each Other, 25 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 103, 103 (2013) [hereinafter Two-Sided Matching] (arguing that investment banks are
selective when deciding which offerings to underwrite); Chitru S. Fernando, Vladimir A.
Gatchev & Paul A. Spindt, Wanna Dance? How Firms and Underwriters Choose Each
Other, 60 J. FIN. 2437, 2437–38 (2005) [hereinafter Wanna Dance?] (the more natural
model is one of mutual choice); see also Sharon Hannes, Private Benefits of Control, An-
titakeover Defenses, and the Perils of Federal Intervention, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 309
(2005) (“[A]ll issuers value the services of the best underwriters, while those underwriters
select only the best issuers to represent.”). For a general discussion of gatekeeping and
underwriters, see Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 741 (2004) (discussing the
definition of gatekeeper), and Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Ef-
fective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 328 (2007) (discussing the same).
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worthy companies to enter.215 Conversely, they exclude unworthy compa-
nies.216 Unworthy companies are those that will not generate long-term
profits for investors (or in rare circumstances, are outright frauds).217
That is to say, gatekeepers help reduce the chance of financial loss to
investors.218
Professor Hass compares the gatekeeping role of the underwriter to
merit review: “Perhaps the most important service that an underwriter
performs is a cold-hearted review of the merits of a proposed offering:
Should the securities of this particular issuer be offered to the public in
the first instance?”219 Professor Hass also explains the gatekeeping role
in terms of protecting investors from financial loss: “[T]he merit review
performed by underwriters centers around profit: Will the proposed of-
fering prove profitable to . . . its investor clientele . . . ?”220
Why do underwriters act as gatekeepers? Self-interest. Underwriters
are motivated by a desire to: (1) protect their reputational capital, (2)
avoid contractual liability, and (3) avoid statutory liability.221 I will dis-
cuss each of these motivations in the sections that follow.
On the other hand, an investment bank acting as a financial advisor is
less incentivized to carefully scrutinize the merits of a company (or a par-
ticular offering) that it is helping to list on a public exchange.222 See the
comparison in the chart below.
215. See Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted Over the Internet: Are
They “Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 96–97 (1998) (discussing the
merit review that underwriters perform); Jeffrey A. Brill, “Testing The Waters”—The
SEC’s Feet Go From Wet to Cold, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 528 (1998) (describing under-
writers as “filters”).
216. See Hass, supra note 215; Brill, supra note 215, at 528–29.
217. See Hass, supra note 215.
218. Of course, the public exchanges also perform a gatekeeping role, refusing to list
companies that they find unworthy. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the NYSE listing
application process). Further, I am not saying that underwriters guaranty the profitability
of an offering they underwrite. Although some legal scholars suggest they should. See
Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540 (2001) (“[I]mpose strict liability on gatekeepers for
material misstatements and omissions in offering documents and remove any due dili-
gence-based defenses from securities regulation.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure
and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 349
(2004) (“the most direct and practical means to this end would be to convert the gate-
keeper into the functional equivalent of an insurer”).
219. Hass, supra note 215, at 96.
220. Id. at 96–97.
221. See infra Sections V.B, C, D.
222. See Farrell & Steele, Spotify Registers, supra note 1 (“The SEC had concerns that
Spotify’s direct listing could open the door for other companies with potentially risky fi-
nancial profiles to access the public markets without giving investors sufficient protec-
tion”); McClane, supra note 24 (“Spotify won’t have the benefit of such a mark of quality,
at least not in the traditional sense.”)
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Chart 5. Incentives to Act as a Gatekeeper223
Role of the Investment Bank
Underwriter Financial Advisor
Does the investment Yes, the underwriter risks Minimal, the financial
bank face reputational its reputation by actively advisor does not actively
pressure to act as a marketing and selling market or sell, and as
gatekeeper? IPO shares to stable of such, risks less
repeat investors. reputational capital.
Does the investment Yes, the underwriter has No, the financial advisor
bank face contractual a contractual duty to faces no contractual duty
pressure to act as a stabilize, meaning that its to stabilize.
gatekeeper? own money is on the
line.
Does the investment Yes, Securities Act § 11 No, it is unlikely that a
bank face statutory makes an underwriter financial advisor would
pressure to act as a liable for post offering be considered a statutory
gatekeeper? losses to shareholders underwriter, and as such,
(where there is a would likely not face
misstatement in the liability under Securities
registration statement). Act § 11.
B. REPUTATIONAL PRESSURE TO ACT AS A GATEKEEPER
1. Underwriters
Reputational pressure—i.e., the desire to build reputational capital—
drives underwriters to be effective gatekeepers.224
Underwriters are under tremendous pressure to maintain and increase
their reputational capital.225 An underwriter’s reputational capital in-
creases when it underwrites successful IPOs (defined as IPOs that result
in both short- and long-term gains for the underwriter’s clients, usually
institutional investors).226 An underwriter’s reputational capital de-
creases when it underwrites flops.227 The underwriter is able to “reap re-
turns on this reputational capital through higher fees charged to issuers
seeking access to the . . . stable of repeat investors.”228
223. This Chart summarizes material contained infra Sections V.B, C, D.
224. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Con-
trols,  93 YALE L.J. 857, 891 (1984).
225. James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence
on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 953 (1996).
226. Hass, supra note 215, at 96; O’Hare, supra note 42, at 255.
227. See McClane, supra note 24 (“[N]obody would invest in, say, Goldman Sachs led
IPOs if they were mostly flops.”); Maher Kooli & Siham Meknassi, The Survival Profile of
U.S. IPO Issuers: 1985-2005, 10 J. WEALTH MGMT. 105, 112 (2007) (“[P]restigious under-
writers have a lot to lose in terms of reputation from a failed underwriting.”).
228. Bohn & Choi, supra note 225. The “reputational capital” theory for underwriters is
supported by empirical evidence that underwriters with good reputations are able to
charge more, see Kenneth A. Carow, Underwriting Spreads and Reputational Capital: An
Analysis of New Corporate Securities, 22 J. FIN. RES. 15, 16 (1999), and provide better
returns to investors. See Anita Indira Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 433, 437 (2003) (citing Richard B. Carter et. al., Underwriter
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To guard its reputational capital, the underwriter will conduct large
amounts of due diligence.229 Before it agrees to underwrite an offering:
[T]he underwriter will want to interview senior executives and key
management members, review financial statements, consider finan-
cial forecasts, meet with auditors, evaluate the issuer’s products and
market share, and consider the proposed use of the proceeds from
the IPO before deciding whether it is interested in negotiating the
terms under which it would underwrite the offering.230
The foregoing should be distinguished from the due diligence that the
underwriter performs during preparation of the registration statement in
order to avoid Section 11 liability.
2. Financial Advisors
A financial advisor handling a direct listing risks less reputational capi-
tal. Unlike an underwriter that risks reputational capital by actively mar-
keting IPO stock to its “stable of repeat investors,”231 a financial advisor
is largely passive.232
For the Spotify direct listing, Goldman et. al. were not even listed on
the bottom of the second page of the F-1 (the location traditionally re-
served for listing underwriters).233 Goldman’s name only appeared once,
on page 181.234 As such, it is probable that many investors did not even
know about the financial advisor’s role (that is to say, it is doubtful that
Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285
(1998)).
229. O’Hare, supra note 42, at 255 (“Before the traditional underwriter agrees to un-
derwrite an offering, it will undertake an extensive review of the issuer. The investing pub-
lic is aware of this investigation and assumes that if the traditional underwriter agreed to
underwrite the offering, the issuer and the issuer’s securities must be both legitimate and a
reasonably safe investment.”).
230. Dentons, Technology Initial Public Offerings - Part 2, MONDAQ [hereinafter Tech
IPOs], http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=43150 [https://perma.cc/79V7-
DWXM] (last updated Oct. 10, 2006) (emphasis added). All of these considerations are
clues as to how profitable the offering will be for the institutional investors that are the
underwriter’s clients. If the institutional investors are happy, the underwriter stands to
make more money (in the form of repeat business) in the future. There are also more
direct financial considerations for the underwriter: the size of the issuer, size of the offering
(of which they will get a percentage up to 7%), and the likelihood the offering will sell.
Two-sided Matching, supra note 214, at 103–04.
Of course, I am not arguing that the desire to maintain reputational capital makes under-
writers perfect gatekeepers. Sometimes even reputable underwriters sponsor offerings that
turn out to be failures, harming investors. For example, Goldman Sachs agreed to under-
write the Blue Apron IPO in 2017, which turned out to be a flop. Maureen Farrell & Corrie
Driebusch, Debut by ADT Fails to Impress, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2018, at B1 (listing Blue
Apron as one of the biggest flops of 2017). Initial investors purchased at $10.00, see Blue
Apron Holdings, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (June 28, 2017), and the stock is now trad-
ing at less than one-fifth that amount, or around $1.75. Blue Apron Holdings, Inc. Class A
APRN, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/quote/xNYS:APRN (last visited Jan. 8, 2019).
231. Bohn & Choi, supra note 225.
232. See supra Section III.C.
233. Spotify Technology S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) 2 (Feb. 28, 2018).
234. Id. at 181.
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all investors understood that Goldman et. al. were acting as financial
advisors).
I am not arguing that there is absolutely no reputational pressure in the
absence of active efforts to market and sell—Goldman et. al. would likely
take some reputational hit if Spotify fails—but that reputational hit is
certainly less that what an underwriter would suffer, comparatively.
C. CONTRACTUAL PRESSURE TO ACT AS A GATEKEEPER
1. Underwriters
The underwriting agreement often requires the underwriter to step in
and make stabilizing bids if the market price drops below the offering
price235 (e.g., “if the public offering price for a security is $10 per share,
and the market price before the completion of the distribution falls to $9
per share, the manager may enter a stabilizing bid of $10 per share to
prevent persons interested in the security from purchasing securities in
the open market at a price below the public offering price”).236
Stabilization can result in a financial loss to the underwriter237 because
the underwriter is buying shares at a price above what the public is willing
to pay.238 If the price of the stock does not react to the underwriter’s
effort, and recover, the underwriter will suffer a loss when they sell.239
A good example of stabilization is provided by the Facebook IPO.240
There, Morgan Stanley’s underwriting agreement required it to engage in
stabilizing transactions and purchases in the event of “downward pressure
on the price of the common stock in the open market.”241 The prospectus
explained that such stabilizing transactions and purchases are intended to
“prevent or retard a decline in the market price of the common stock.”242
Unfortunately, a perfect storm of problems—including a last-minute
cut in projected earnings—placed downward pressure on Facebook’s
stock price as it began to trade.243 It fell eleven percent after the open-
235. Alexander Hamilton Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities
Market, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1957).
236. Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer’s Guide to the Operation of Underwriting Syndicates,
26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 349 (1991). One issue here is the line between permissible
stabilization and manipulation. See Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of
Corporate Finance, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1090 n.110 (1991) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
7(c) (2017)) (“No stabilizing bid or purchase shall be made except for the purpose of
preventing or retarding a decline in the open market price of a security.”).
237. Frey, supra note 235.
238. Allen, supra note 236.
239. Frey, supra note 235.
240. Lowinger v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, 841 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2016).
241. Facebook, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 165 (May 17, 2012).
242. Id.
243. Michael J. de la Merced, Evelyn M. Rusli & Susanne Craig, As Facebook’s Stock
Struggles, Fingers Start Pointing, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2012, at B1.
206 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
ing.244 Morgan Stanley had to step in to help stabilize the price.245 Fortu-
nately for Morgan Stanley, Facebook shares ended the day almost at the
same place they started.246
How does stabilization implicate gatekeeping? The underwriter will
not agree to underwrite the offering—i.e., will close the gate to the public
markets—absent confidence that the contractual duty to stabilize will not
be triggered (or in the event that it is triggered, economic loss will be
minimal).
2. Financial Advisors
The financial advisors to the Spotify direct listing did not face an obli-
gation to make stabilizing bids.247 Indeed, it appears that they were for-
bidden from making stabilizing bids by the terms of a no-action letter
from the SEC Division of Markets and Trading regarding Regulation
M.248 The no action letter from the SEC is specifically premised on the
representation that “none of the Financial Advisors have been engaged
or requested, directly or indirectly, by the Company (whether before or
after the NYSE Opening Time) to stabilize or support the price of the
Shares.”249
Spotify’s prospectus explained to investors that the non-duty of the fi-
nancial advisors to stabilize or support the price of the shares is a signifi-
cant risk of investing:
Additionally, because there are no underwriters, there is no under-
writers’ option to purchase additional shares to help stabilize, main-
tain, or affect the public price of our ordinary shares on the NYSE
immediately after the listing. . . . [Without such stabilization,] [t]he
public price of our ordinary shares may be volatile, and could, upon
listing on the NYSE, decline significantly and rapidly.250
D. STATUTORY PRESSURE TO ACT AS A GATEKEEPER
1. Underwriters
Section 11 of the Securities Act makes underwriters liable for misstate-
244. Jacob Bunge, Aaron Lucchetti & Gina Chon, Investors Pummel Facebook—Stock
Falls 11% in First Full Day of Trading; Complaints of Too Many Shares, WALL ST. J., May
22, 2012, at A1.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Nicole Bullock & Anna Nicolaou, Spotify’s Offbeat Direct Approach to Investors
Makes for Easy Listing, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2018, at 19 (“By opting for an innovative direct
listing, instead of a traditional initial public offering, the music streaming company had . . .
no banks to stabilize its share price if things went awry”).
248. No Action Letter, supra note 171, at 4. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) explains that “Regulation M is designed to prevent manipulation by individuals
with an interest in the outcome of an offering, and prohibits activities and conduct that
could artificially influence the market for an offered security.” Regulation M Filings,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/regulation-m-filings [https://perma.cc/ZS4U-FS9W]
(last visited Jan. 8, 2019).
249. No Action Letter, supra note 171, at 9.
250. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 45 (Mar. 23, 2018).
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ments in the registration statement.251 To avoid liability, underwriters
must show that they exercised due diligence while preparing the registra-
tion statement.252 However, avoiding liability does not mean that the un-
derwriter will conduct due diligence only after it becomes underwriter
(although that is generally how it is viewed).253 It also means that the
underwriter will conduct due diligence before agreeing to underwrite the
offering.254
An investment bank will avoid agreeing to underwrite an offering that
could result in a loss to shareholders post-offering (after all, it is that loss
that often gives rise to the Section 11 action; finding a material misstate-
ment is usually an afterthought).255 By being selective about the offerings
it will underwrite—to avoid statutory liability—the underwriter performs
its essential gatekeeping duty of preventing unworthy companies from
entering the public markets.
2. Financial Advisors
Financial advisors to a direct listing do not face the same statutory
pressure to act as a gatekeeper. The participants in the Spotify direct list-
ing were careful not to label Goldman et. al. as underwriters, but instead
as financial advisors.256 Spotify’s F-1 it states:
We have engaged Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Morgan Stanley, and
Allen & Company LLC as our financial advisors to advise and assist
the Company with respect to certain matters relating to our listing.
However, the financial advisors have not been engaged to participate
in investor meetings . . . .257
251. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2012). As the court stated
in Escott v. BarChris, “[t]he purpose of Section 11 is to protect investors. To that end the
underwriters are made responsible for the truth of the prospectus.” Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of
Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 148–150 (2001) (discussing gatekeeping role of
underwriter in securities offering through the lens of Section 11 liability).
252. Securities Act § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2012). How much due diligence
depends on the type of misstatement contained in the registration statement. Id. For non-
expertized portions of the registration statement, the underwriter must show that it con-
ducted a reasonable investigation into the fact, and that it had reasonable grounds to be-
lieved it was true. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A). For an expertized portion, like the balance
sheet or income statement, the underwriter simply need show that it had no reasonable
ground to believe that it was untrue. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C).
253. Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End:
The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 710–12 (1999).
254. John H. Langmore and Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1084
(1991) (“[P]restigious underwriters can be selective and avoid issuers that present legal
risks”); Candida P. Jose, Section 11 of The Securities Act of 1933: The Disproportionate
Liability Imputed to Accountants, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 565, 567 (2002) (to avoid section 11
liability, accountants are selective in the offerings they handle).
255. And it is relatively easy to find some material misstatement in a 100-page registra-
tion statement.
256. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 186 (Mar. 23, 2018).
257. Id.
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Likewise, Spotify’s lawyers, Latham & Watkins, were careful to avoid
labelling Goldman et. al. as underwriters. They write in a letter to the
SEC:
Notably, the Advisory Engagement Letters do not engage any of the
Financial Advisors to act in an underwriting capacity in respect of
any offers or sales made by the Registered Shareholders pursuant to
the Form F-1 and expressly provide that the Financial Advisors will
not further assist the Company in the planning of, or actively partici-
pate in, investor meetings.258
The scope of the engagement appears designed to avoid Goldman et.
al. being labelled as underwriters.259 However, even if an investment
bank is a financial advisor in the view of all parties to the transaction, it
could still be deemed a statutory underwriter by a court, that is to say, an
underwriter for purposes of Section 11 of the Securities Act.260 The start-
ing point must be the plain language of the Act.261 It defines underwriter
as:
[A]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any
security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in
any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the
direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking.262
Goldman et. al. did not purchase any shares from Spotify as part of
their financial advisor duties, and thus can avoid underwriter designation
under the language “purchased from an issuer with a view to . . . the
distribution of any security.”263 However, the definition of underwriter
also includes “offers or sells for an issuer.”264 Are Goldman et al. en-
gaged in offering and selling? More precisely, is not directing investor
meetings (as both the F-1 and the Latham Letter emphasize)265 enough
to avoid “offer[ing] or sell[ing] for an issuer in connection with, the distri-
bution of any security”?266 Clearly, it depends on what else the financial
advisor is doing. I would point to the fact that while they are not directing
the investor meetings, they are apparently helping to prepare the slides
that are used at those meetings, as possible support for underwriter
status.267
258. No Action Letter, supra note 171, at 9.
259. Id.; see Grabar, Lopez & Basham, supra note 25 (“This limitation may have been
intended in part to support the view that the financial advisors are not underwriters under
the Securities Act, and do not have potential liability under Section 11, with respect to all
sales under the registration statement.”).





265. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 186 (Mar. 23, 2018); No Action
Letter, supra note 171, at 4.
266. Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (2012).
267. No Action Letter, supra note 171, at 9.
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Second, what does it mean to “participate”, either “directly or indi-
rectly”? On this point, Professor Coffee, writing about the Spotify offer-
ing, questions whether Goldman et. al. can avoid underwriter liability,
citing the case of Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc.268 The
issue in Raffensperger was whether a firm that “recommend the yield” at
which debt securities would be issued was a statutory underwriter subject
to Section 11 liability.269 The Seventh Circuit found that Raffensperger
was an underwriter, agreeing with the district court that “because Raffen-
sperger’s actions were ‘necessary to and a substantial factor in’ the distri-
bution of the Firstmark notes, Raffensperger ‘participated,’ at least
indirectly, in their distribution.”270 Similarly, in the Spotify direct listing,
Goldman et. al. were required to recommend an opening price to the
DMM (however, the “DMM would not be bound by the input he or she
receives from the financial advisor”).271
I believe Raffensperger can be distinguished on two grounds. First, im-
portant to the court’s decision was the fact that Raffensperger called itself
an underwriter (specifically, a qualified independent underwriter).272
That is not the case in the Spotify direct listing, where Goldman et. al.
diligently avoided the underwriter label.273 Second, under NASD rules
Reffensperger was deemed “to undertake the legal responsibilities and
liabilities of an underwriter under the Securities Act of 1933, specifically
including those inherent in Section 11 thereof.”274 Goldman et. al., as far
as I am aware, did not make any similar representation.
Basham, Lopez and Grabar explained the quandary thus: “[A]s Spotify
illustrates, there is not necessarily any party that could be described as an
underwriter, and in the absence of underwriters, there may not be any
party with a persuasive statutory motive to perform due diligence.”275 I
agree. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that Goldman et. al.
were not acting as an underwriter for the direct listing.276 However, the
reader should recognize that, as set forth above, this is not settled law.
If they are not acting as underwriters, the financial advisors have no
liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act.277 This greatly reduces the
268. Coffee, supra note 3 (citing Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392
(7th Cir. 1995)).
269. Raffensperger, 65 F.3d at 1397.
270. Id. at 1396.
271. No Action Letter, supra note 171, at 10.
272. Raffensperger, 65 F.3d at 1396.
273. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 186 (Mar. 23, 2018); No Action
Letter, supra note 171, at 9.
274. Raffensperger, 65 F.3d at 1398 (citing NASD Compliance Manual, (CCH) ¶ 1882,
Sch. E, § 2(o)(7) (1994)).
275. Grabar, Lopez & Basham, supra note 25.
276. It is worth noting that the SEC accepted for purposes of the letter, but did not
necessarily concur in, the representation that: “The Company will engage the Financial
Advisors solely to provide advice and assistance to the Company with respect to the filing
of the Form F-1 and the Listing of the Shares on the NYSE but not to provide underwriting,
solicitation, or distribution services with respect to any offers or sales made under the Form
F-1.” No Action Letter, supra note 171, at 3 (emphasis added).
277. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
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motivation for them to act as diligent gatekeepers. So while they will still
help in the preparation and filing of the F-1, without liability attaching
thereto, they are less likely to be selective in deciding who they will un-
derwrites in the first place. Financial advisors are less concerned in deter-
mining if the issuer is engaged in the kind of loose recordkeeping (or
taking liberties with facts) that would lead to liability for an underwriter.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Investment banks, acting as underwriters, play an important gatekeep-
ing role. Before assisting a company with an IPO, they perform a merit
review.278 They do so to protect their reputation (they do not want to be
associated with a flop), as well as for more direct financial reasons (i.e.,
avoiding possible contractual or statutory liability).279
The role of investment banks in direct listings is different. They act as
mere financial advisors.280 Financial advisors do not face the same
reputational risk (they do not actively market or sell the stock to their
institutional clients), and therefore, are less likely to conduct the same
level of merit review.281
Some might argue that, even absent active marketing and selling,
reputational capital is implicated.282 However, as Professor Partnoy
points out, “there has emerged an unrebutted theoretical argument that
gatekeepers might rationally decide to deplete their reputational capital
(just as they would deplete any other capital asset) in an attempt to maxi-
mize expected profits.”283 This is likely to be especially true, in cases like
the one before us, where the financial advisors’ reputational capital is
only minimally implicated (recall that that as financial advisors, Goldman
et. al. were not actively marketing Spotify stock to their “stable of repeat
investors,” and their name was hidden deep within the prospectus).284
Nor do investment banks acting as financial advisors face the same risk
of liability.285 They face no contractual liability if they fail to stabilize
falling shares (and thus face no financial pressure to prevent an unworthy
candidate from entering the public market in the first place).286 They face
no Section 11 liability.287 And so, to return to the question posed by the
title of this Article: “Is Spotify’s direct listing a recipe for gatekeeper fail-
ure?” The answer is yes.
278. Hass, supra note 215; Brill, supra note 215.
279. See supra Sections V.B, C, D.
280. See supra Section III.B.
281. See supra Section V.B.
282. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (In a related context,
Judge Easterbrook wrote, “[a]n accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty.”).
283. Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84
B.U. L. REV. 365, 367 (2004) (citing Coffee, supra note 218, at 326).
284. Bohn & Choi, supra note 225.
285. See supra Part V.
286. See supra Section V.C.
287. See supra Section V.D.
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The second logical question is, “Do we care?” Or, phrased differently,
“If few companies go public by direct listing, does it harm enough inves-
tors to justify changing how direct listings are done?” It is true that few
companies are planning on going public by direct listing. However, those
companies that are considering going public by direct listing are very
large; they will attract billions of dollars of investors’ money.288 Airbnb
and Uber, both valued in the tens of billions of dollars, are considering
direct listing.289 Should they go public, and fail, the loss to investors
would be enormous.
Further, the companies considering direct listing are mostly technology
companies. The price of tech company stock tends to run up without any
relation to company profits or profitability to investors.290 Indeed, look-
ing back at the 2000 tech bubble,291 tech companies often had multi-bil-
lion valuations before they even turned a profit, as was the case with
eToys.292 eToys went public in 1999 at $20 per share (and shot up to $78
per share) despite the fact that its profits were a negative $28.6 million.293
It eventually went bankrupt.294
In short, if more tech unicorns follow a direct listing model, (1) large
sums of investor cash will be implicated, and (2) those investors face a
heightened danger of inflated stock prices, followed by rapid decline.
That is not the time to reduce the role of gatekeepers in ferreting out
problem companies.
And so, the third logical question, “How can investment banks (specifi-
cally, those that are acting as financial advisors to a direct listing) be en-
couraged to be more effective gatekeepers?” The answer to that could fill
an additional law review article (the intent here is simply to begin the
scholarly debate).
One possibility is to align the success of the financial advisor with the
success of the company that is direct listing. Here, deferred fees tied to
the direct listing company’s future stock long-term performance comes to
mind. The financial advisor’s fees could be paid into trust, and paid out
over time, as the company meets specified benchmarks.
288. Osterland, supra note 9.
289. Id.; Sorkin, supra note 108.
290. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 199–200 (3d ed. 2015).
291. See Heather Long, It Feels ‘Like 2006’—Why that’s Unsettling, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
2018, at G.1 (“More than 100 U.S. start-ups are valued at over $1 billion each”); Jamie
Powell, Regulatory Axe can Chop Tech Stocks Down to Size, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 2018, at
23 (“Over the past few years noted market oracles have claimed we are in the midst of
another tech bubble, only to see the technology groups shoot higher.”). Analysts at
Goldman Sachs can’t seem to make up their mind. In June 2017 they stated that tech stocks
were riding on a “valuation air pocket.” Reinhardt Krause, FANG Stocks, Apple Take Hit;
Goldman Sachs Calls Out ‘Air Pocket’, INV.’S BUS. DAILY (June 9, 2017), https://www.in-
vestors.com/news/technology/forget-fang-goldman-adds-apple-microsoft-faamg-to-tech-
leaders/. Then, in June 2018, they published a note entitled “Why tech is not a bubble.”
Jamie Powell, supra.
292. SHILLER, supra note 290.
293. Id.; see eToys Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 1 (May 19, 1999).
294. SHILLER, supra note 290, at 199.
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Perhaps the most obvious solution is to deem a financial advisor to be
an underwriter for purposes of the Securities Act of 1933.295 As men-
tioned in the main body of this Article, Raffensperger was decided (at
least partially) on the basis that NASDAQ rules required that a qualified
independent underwriter (a person with many characteristics akin to a
financial advisor) agree “to undertake the legal responsibilities and liabil-
ities of an underwriter under the Securities Act of 1933, specifically in-
cluding those inherent in Section 11 thereof.”296 Similar wording in the
NYSE Listed Company Manual regarding financial advisors to direct list-
ings would place a great deal of pressure on them to avoid associating
with any direct listing that could result in a loss to the investing public.
VII. POSTSCRIPT
In the summer of 2018, it was not clear if Spotify marked the beginning
of a trend toward more direct listings, or was instead a one-off. I believed
Spotify was the beginning of a trend. That belief was vindicated just prior
to publication. On February 4, 2019, Slack Technologies, Inc.—Slack pro-
duces an intra-office messaging app that provides a single place for co-
workers to message and share files297—announced that it expected to
conduct a direct listing in the second quarter of 2019.298 The parallels
between Slack’s direct listing and Spotify’s direct listing are
unmistakable:
295. See supra Section IV.D.2.
296. Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1398 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing
NASD Compliance Manual, (CCH) ¶ 1882, Sch. E, § 2(o)(7) (1994)).
297. Why Slack?, SLACK, https://slack.com/features (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
298. Slack Team, Slack Announces Confidential Submission of Draft Registration State-
ment for Proposed Public Listing, SLACK (Feb. 4, 2019), https://slackhq.com/slack-announ
ces-confidential-submission-of-draft-registration-statement-for-proposed-public-listing; see
Maureen Farrell, Slack is Second to File for Direct IPO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2019, at B1
(discussing Slack’s announcement).
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Chart 6. Spotify and Slack
Spotify Slack
Valuation (Pre-Listing) $20 billion Between $7 and $13
billion299
Capital Raised Privately $2.7 billion300 $1 billion301
(Pre-Listing)
Motivation Provide liquidity to early Provide liquidity to early
investors; no need to investors; no need to
raise new capital302 raise new capital303
Investment Advisors Goldman Sachs Group, Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc., Morgan Stanley and Inc., Morgan Stanley and
Allen & Co.304 Allen & Co.305
Exchange NYSE Unknown
More information will be available once Slack’s filing with the SEC
become public.306 However, it appears that the SEC is insisting—like it
did with Spotify—that Slack file a form S-1, meaning it (as the issuer) is
still subject to Section 11 liability for material misstatements, and that the
company will face limits on communications while waiting for approval
from the SEC.307 Those are important safeguards.
However, it is clear that Goldman et. al. will be acting as financial advi-
sors, not underwriters. As the foregoing Article lays out in detail, finan-
cial advisors face less incentives to be effective gatekeepers (as compared
to underwriters), whether in the form of reputational incentives, or direct
financial incentives.308 It is true that the danger of an underwriter-less
offering did not lead to bad results in the case of Spotify, and an under-
writer-less offering may not lead to bad results in the case of Slack. How-
299. Erin Griffith, Slack Quietly Joins the Stampede of Start-Ups Bound for the Market,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2019, at B5.
300. Katie Roof, Spotify Opens at $165.90, Valuing Company at Almost $30 billion,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/03/spotify-opens-at-165-90-
valuing-company-at-30-billion/. Early private investors included Tencent, Tiger Global,
Sony Music and Technology Crossover Ventures. Id.
301. Griffith, supra note 299. Those early investors include SoftBank Vision Fund,
General Atlantic, Dragoneer Investment Group, and T. Rowe Price Associated. Id.
302. Farrell & Steele, Spotify Registers, supra note 1.
303. Felix Salmon, Slack Eyes a Direct Listing, AXIOS (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.axios
.com/slack-direct-listing-ipo-63cb8bf0-71a1-45ee-8472-99a036c229c8.html (“A lot of people
would love the opportunity to invest in Slack, while many others, including employees,
would love the opportunity to be able to sell their stock at will and diversify their
investments.”).
304. Spotify Technology S.A., Prospectus (Rule 424B4) 186 (Mar. 23, 2018).
305. Maureen Farrell, Slack Plans Direct-Listing Deal: Instant Message Company Looks
at Same Route for Going Public as Spotify, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2019, at B3.
306. For now, the filing is confidential. Griffith, supra note 299.
307. The company appears to be following such restrictions. Its press release announc-
ing it had filed its S-1 was bare bones, stating that it was not an offer to sell a security, and
that it was being issued in accordance with Rule 135 under the Securities Act. See Slack
Team, supra note 298.
308. See supra Section V.
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ever, the danger of an underwriter-less offering should not be ignored as
direct listings proliferate—which they now appear to be doing—in the
future.
